Table 4 shows the results of the hierarchical regression. Overall, the F values are greater than one for all models with significance at five percent level or higher. Adjusted R square ranges from 11.78% to 20.62%. Models 2 to 3 of Table 4 show that the CEO incentive-based compensation is a significant predictor of the abnormal cost of equity capital (p < 0.05). This suggests that the higher the CEO incentive-based compensation, the lower the cost of equity capital. Models 3 of Table 4 reveals that firms with coercive RFID adoption are related negatively and significantly to the abnormal cost of equity capital of the firms (p < 0.05). This indicates that the adopting firms confirmed to coercive adoption could obtain lower abnormal cost of equity capital than self-initiated adopters. As shown in Models 1 to 3 in Table 4, financial slack is related positively to the abnormal cost of equity capital. This indicates that firms with more financial slack obtained less benefit in the reduction of cost of equity capital because they had less need for financing from outside. Moreover, industry sales growth are negatively related to the abnormal cost of equity capital, suggesting that firms in those industries with higher sales growth were able to enjoy lower cost of equity capital after RFID adoption.