Panel C of Table 8 presents results of the effect of SOX. It shows a significantly negative coefficient on SOX in columns (1) and (2), indicating a reduction in earnings management in the post-SOX period, especially for income-increasing earrings management. The coefficient on CEO_Relsh is positive and significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (2), confirming the effect of CEO religiosity in constraining earnings management previously documented in Table 4 . More interestingly, the interaction term, CEO_Relsh ∗ SOX , has a coefficient of 0.026 in column (2), statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with the notion that the role of CEO religiosity in limiting earnings management weakens in the post- SOX period, although the effect of CEO religiosity on earnings man- agement remain significant even in the post-SOX period as shown in columns (4) and (5). Overall, our results in Table 8 are consistent with our hypotheses that CEO religiosity limits earnings manage- ment, especially when incentives to cook the numbers are stronger.