The intuition for this result is as

对于该结果的直觉如下。例如，假设αpe <br><1/2。在<br>这种情况下，购买者处于外围市场的拥挤侧（πb= 1且πs <br><1）。<br>因此，关联卖方具有很强的议价能力，可以<br>在外围市场中以高于核心市场价格的价格进行交易。由于它们<br>在外围市场上交易更好，因此无法获得ICS均衡<br>。16因此，均衡<br>是ACD或ICB。获得哪种均衡取决于无关联的<br>卖方是对两种类型的买方（ACD均衡）还是<br>仅对无关联的买方（ICB均衡）具有吸引力的交易。如果没有关联的卖方提出拒绝，<br>他无法进行核心交易。为了避免这种结果，卖方可以提供足够低的价格以<br>使关联的买方可以接受，即低于核心价格的价格。<br>当（i）核心市场价格下降或（ii）<br>非关联买家愿意接受的价格上涨时，即当<br>为非关联买家找到交易对手的可能性时，该选项对卖方的吸引力相对降低。他拒绝FF ER-降低（即邻<br>αP <br>edecreases）。因此，ICS均衡可获得足够低的核心市场价格<br>或足够小的αpe <br>（从而满足条件p <br>co <（1-ωs）C <br>b - <br>ωsCsis）。<br>否则，将获得ACD平衡。

此结果的直觉如下。例如，假设<br>e

The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose, for instance, that αpe< 1/2. Inthis case, buyers are on the crowded side of the peripheral market (πb= 1 and πs< 1).Therefore, connected sellers have a strong bargaining position and can trade at pricesabove the core market price in the peripheral market. Because they are better off tradingin the peripheral market, the ICS equilibrium cannot be obtained.16Hence the equilibriumis either ACD or ICB. Which equilibrium is obtained depends on whether unconnectedsellers make offers that are attractive to both types of buyers (the ACD equilibrium) oronly unconnected buyers (the ICB equilibrium). If an unconnected seller’s offer is rejected,he cannot trade in the core. To avoid this outcome, the seller can offer a price low enough tobe acceptable by connected buyers, i.e., a price below the core price. This option becomesrelatively less attractive for the seller when (i) the core market price decreases or (ii) theprice that an unconnected buyer is willing to accept increases, that is, when the likelihoodof finding a counterparty for an unconnected buyer–if he rejects an offer–decreases (i.e.,αpedecreases). Thus, the ICS equilibrium obtains for a sufficiently low core market priceor a sufficiently small αpe(so that the condition pco< (1−ωs)Cb−ωsCsis satisfied).Otherwise, the ACD equilibrium obtains.<br>