The Scope and Limits of Mimesis The

范围和摹仿的限制<br>。因此，很显然，模仿的分级和其各方面的示范还远远不够。模仿总是与现实有关。因此，我们必须定义现实的含义。现在应该很清楚，据我所知，模仿的参照领域是我们的现实，无论是自然的还是社会的，都是由具体的对象，事件，过程（无论是内部还是外部的，当描述前者或和描绘的情况），以简单或复杂的结构，以某些向内和向外的关系，以各种细分形式出现。<br>我知道这种过度简化的模型在认识论和本体论上的缺陷。Gombrich在书中苦苦挣扎的问题不仅涉及感知世界的过程，而且涉及人类知识发展的整体分析。当他说我们按照我们的理解进行解释时，他所触及的问题超出了心理学的范围。<br>每一个知情行为都至少由三件事决定：它所固定的对象；就理解世界的一般能力而言，该主题；以及当前的知识状态。第四点是个人修改，尽管这对于说明创作过程和美学反应很重要，但可以在此处传递。这三个基本条件足以加强我先前的论点，即模仿不是镜像形式对现实的被动复制。在复制中，不亚于半模仿作品，模仿伴随着某种创造性的元素。但是，贡布里希（Gombrich）以及其他作家（例如Francastel和Strzemiński），从这种在历史背景下具体化的客体条件得出了更为极端的结论，因为他们质疑现实的任何单一概念的意义，因为它是由视觉意识的程度或广义上来说是人类知识总和的投射所调节的。这种情况的麻烦在于，它使人的感知中的活性成分绝对化。

The Scope and Limits of Mimesis <br>Therefore, it is clear that the grading of mimesis and the demonstrating of its aspects does not go far enough. Mimesis always relates to reality; we must, therefore, define what we mean by reality. It should by now be clear that the field of reference for mimesis as I understand the category is our reality, both natural and social, as made up of concrete objects, events, processes (internal as well as external, when the former are described or depicted), and situations, appearing in various segmentations, in certain inward and outward relationships, in simple or complex structures.<br>I am aware of the epistemological and ontological pitfalls of such an oversimplified model. The problems with which Gombrich wrestled in his book concern not only the process of perceiving the world but also an overall analysis of the development of human knowledge. When he says that we interpret as we perceive, he is touching on an issue that goes beyond the limits of psychology.<br>Every act of knowing is governed by at least three things: the object on which it fastens; the subject in the sense of the generic capacities for apprehending the world; and the current state of knowledge. There is a fourth point—individual modification—which, crucial though it is to an account of the creative process and aesthetic response, can be passed over here. Those three basic conditions are enough to reinforce my earlier argument that mimesis is not the passive copying of reality in the manner of a mirror. In reproduction no less than in semimimetic works, imitation is accompanied by a certain creative element. However, Gombrich, as well as other writers like Francastel and Strzemiński, have drawn far more extreme conclusions from such subject-object conditioning concretized in an historical context, since they question the meaningfulness of any single concept of reality on account of its being modulated by the degree of visual awareness or, in broader terms, being a projection of a sum of human knowledge. The trouble with this case is that it absolutizes the active element in human perception.

模仿的范围和限度<br>因此，很明显，模仿的分级及其各方面的展示还远远不够。模仿总是与现实有关；因此，我们必须界定我们所指的现实。现在应该清楚的是，我所理解的模仿范畴的参照范围是我们的现实，包括自然的和社会的，由具体的对象、事件、过程（当前者被描述或描绘时，内部的和外部的）和以各种分段出现的情况组成，在某些内在和外在的关系中，在简单或复杂的结构中。<br>我意识到这样一个过于简单化的模型在认识论和本体论上的缺陷。戈布里希在书中所讨论的问题不仅涉及到对世界的认识过程，而且还涉及到对人类知识发展的全面分析。当他说我们的理解是我们感知到的，他是在触及一个超越心理学极限的问题。<br>每一种认知行为至少受三件事支配：它所依附的对象；理解世界的一般能力意义上的主体；以及当前的知识状态。有第四点个人的修改，这是至关重要的，虽然它是一个帐户的创造过程和审美反应，可以在这里传递。这三个基本条件足以加强我先前的论点，即模仿不是以镜子的方式被动复制现实。在复制品上不亚于半模仿作品，模仿伴随着一定的创作元素。然而，贡布里希以及其他作家，如弗朗卡斯特和斯特泽明斯基，从这种在历史背景下具体化的主客体制约中得出了更为极端的结论，因为他们质疑任何单一的现实概念的意义，因为它受到视觉觉知程度的调节，或者在更广泛的范围内术语，是人类知识总和的投影。这个案例的问题在于它赦免了人类感知中的积极因素。<br>