国外研究股权激励制度的文献比较丰富，从股权激励制度研究的内容来看，主要

Foreign literature on equity incentive systems is relatively rich. From the perspective of equity incentive system research, it mainly focuses on the research on the relationship between equity incentive systems and company performance, divided into equity-performance positive correlation theory and equity-performance independent theory. <br>Lin C (2012) believes that the effects of equity incentives of listed companies are mainly affected by many factors, such as the company's early strategy, exercise prices, option pricing models, types of equity incentives, and repricing of transaction prices. Kuntara Pukthuanthong and Xingli Li (2016) pointed out that although equity incentives are beneficial to the company, securities fraud among senior management has begun to increase. Jiang long zheng (2016) believes that the false behavior of the company's major shareholders will make the equity incentives not achieve the expected results, and may even have a negative impact. MinChuang Kim and D. Eric Boyd (2016) research shows that when certain boundary conditions are determined, CMO equity has a higher impact on shareholder value. When Saloniemi and Sami (2016) studied the equity incentive effect of executives, they found that the proportion of stocks held by executives after going through the equity incentive plan will increase significantly, but there is no positive incentive for the company's performance to improve, and the company's operating efficiency Instead, performance fell. <br>The equity-performance irrelevance theory means that there is no correlation between the equity incentive system and the company's performance. The implementation of the equity incentive system cannot affect the company's performance. Jensen and Murphy (2000) selected 73 manufacturing companies for research. These 73 companies were ranked better in performance from 1969 to 1983. The research found that the equity incentive system can affect the company's value to some extent, but This effect is minimal and can basically be ignored

The literature of foreign research on equity incentive system is rich, from the content of the equity incentive system research, mainly focused on the relationship between the equity incentive system and the company's performance, divided into equity-performance positive correlation theory and equity-performance irrelevant theory.<br>According to Lin C (2012), the effect of equity incentives of listed companies is mainly influenced by a variety of factors, such as the company's early strategy, exercise price, option pricing model, equity incentive type, re-pricing of trading price and other factors. Kuntara Pukthuanthong and Xingli Li (2016) point out that while equity incentives are good for the company, securities fraud at the senior level is starting to increase. Jiang long zheng (2016) believes that the false behavior of the company's major shareholders can cause the equity incentive to fall short of the desired effect and even have a negative impact. Research by MinChuang Kim and D. Eric Boyd (2016) shows that CMO equity has a higher impact on shareholder value when certain boundary conditions are determined. Saloniemi, Sami (2016) studies the equity incentive effect of executives, and finds that the proportion of shares held by executives after the equity incentive scheme increases significantly, but there is no positive incentive for the company's performance to improve, and the company's operating efficiency and performance decline.<br>The irrelevance of equity performance means that there is no correlation between the equity incentive system and the company's performance, and the implementation of the equity incentive system can not have an impact on the company's performance. Jensen and Murphy (2000) studied 73 manufacturing companies, which were ranked better in 1969-1983, and found that equity incentive systems could affect the company's value to some extent, but the impact was minimal and could be largely ignored.

There are a lot of documents about equity incentive system in foreign countries. From the content of equity incentive system, it mainly focuses on the research on the relationship between equity incentive system and corporate performance, which is divided into equity performance positive correlation theory and equity performance irrelevant theory.<br>Lin C (2012) believes that the effect of equity incentive of listed companies is mainly affected by many factors, such as early strategy, exercise price, option pricing model, equity incentive type, re pricing of transaction price, etc. Kuntara pukthuanthong and Xingli Li Li (2016) pointed out that although equity incentive is beneficial to the company, securities fraud in the senior management began to increase. Jiang Long Zheng (2016) believes that the false behavior of the major shareholders of the company will make the equity incentive fail to achieve the expected effect, and even have a negative impact. Minchuang Kim and D. Eric Boyd (2016) have shown that when certain boundary conditions are determined, CMO equity has a higher impact on shareholder value. When saloniemi and Sami (2016) studied the equity incentive effect of senior executives, they found that the proportion of the number of shares held by senior executives after going through the equity incentive plan will increase significantly, but there is no positive incentive effect on the performance improvement of the company, and the operating efficiency and performance of the company will decline instead.<br>The theory of equity performance independence means that there is no correlation between equity incentive system and corporate performance, and the implementation of equity incentive system can not affect corporate performance. Jensen and Murphy (2000) selected 73 manufacturing enterprises for research. The 73 enterprises ranked better in performance from 1969 to 1983 respectively. Through the research, we found that the equity incentive system can affect the value of the company to some extent, but the impact is very small, which can be ignored