The first sequence to be investigated here can be seen as parallel in its initial phases to the events emanating from Amphilochian Argos.In the summer of 426 the Athenian general Demosthenes, commanding a combined force of Athenians, Acarnanians, Zacynthians, Cephallenians and Corcyreans, conducts operations before the main city of the island of Lcukas. His military situation is so favorable as to make success appear certain (3.94.1-2).However, he allows himself to be persuaded by Messenians from Naupactus, who point to the size of his assembled army, to attack the Aetolians. They entice him with the prospect of extending Athenian influence also throughout to àzo HetpoTIKóv; because of their opponents' light armament, military difficulties are forecast as negligible (3-4).Demosthenes follows this advice not so much as a favor to the Messenians as out of personal ambition. He is thinking of advancing through Aetolia, Locris, Doris and Phocis all the way into Boeotia, and áveu tic tov 'Aenvaiov öuváueoc (95.1) at that.But already for the first stage-the conquest of Aetolia-the plan incurs deficiencies and is in need of certain corrections. The army, initially so large, shrinks with the loss of the Acarnanians ('because of the non-circumvallation of Leukas') and the Corcyreans. Then the Ozolian Locrians, the only members of the force familiar with Actolian tactics and terrain, fail to arrive ('they should have met the Athenians with all their army'). But because he meets with no resistance in his opening forays, Demosthenes is confirmed in his opinion, taken over from the Messenians, that the Aetolians are nor to be taken seriously as military opponents (97.1). Thucydides criticizes his irresponsible recklessness both directly ('trusting the good fortune') and indirectly by describing the Aetolians' extensive and timely defense measures (96.3) immediately before reporting Demosthenes expectations (97.1-2).