Though Bloedow thinks that Hermocrates would have attempted to avoid a pitched battle, he (like his forerunners) still discusses the possible chronological room for Hermocrates to have carried out his strategy, including the amassing of an adequate fleet', and Bloedow also states Syracusan 'advantages' in either case', i.e. (I understand) in case the Athenians decide to give up their campaign or to go ahead with it.This misses Hermocrates' bluff, the point of which relies on immediate action without time for preparation. For (he says) 'most appropriate at this point in time' (34.4), would be for us Sicilians 'to pull to water all the existing (available) fleet' (33.3) and, with two months' supplies, to sail to Tarentum and the lapygian promontory [at the heel of the Italiar boot] to face the Athenians' (34.4), so they would be scared by the idea of having to fight for crossing the sea even before fighting for (or around) Sicily.Hermocrates then goes on to develop the thought process, Aoyiouóg (34.4 and 6), which the Athenians would be going through upon hearing the unwelcome (and probably exaggerated, 34.7) reports about a Sicilian feet lying in wait for them. We can easily translate the Aoyiouós into the first person plural, i.e. into the targeted persona of the Athenians:with Tarentum as their base, the Sicilians move from friendly territory as its protectors; but for us Athenians the sea is wide to cross with our whole force (which it will be hard to keep in order because of the length of the trip), and we shall be easy targets, approaching slowly and in sections (34.4; cf. 4.10.4 and 11.3). But if we disembarrass and concentrate our fastsailing boats and send them all ahead on an advance attack, they will, if they have to use oars, be exhausted and easily be attacked themselves; alternatively [in case our boats encounter favorable winds], if the Sicilians choose not to attack, they can withdraw to Tarentum; but our fast-sailing boats, equipped for a naval engagement with few supplies, will be at a loss facing uninhabited areas where they have to go ashore overnight]: either, when our boats stay, the Sicilians will besiege them, or, when trying to sail along the coast, they will leave our main force behind and, uncertain about the reception by the local cities, will be disheartened.